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Invited Debate: Comment
The Trouble With Interpreting Statistically
Nonsignificant Effect Sizes in Single-Study Investigations
Joel R. Levin

Daniel H. Robinson

University of Arizona

University of Texas at Austin

In this commentary, we offer a perspective on the problem of authors reporting and interpreting effect sizes in
the absence of formal statistical tests of their chanceness . The perspective reinforces our previous distinction
between single -study investigations and multiple -study syntheses.
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Introduction

marized as follows: Research conductors and
consumers need to be more attentive to the
different purposes/functions of an educational
research article. Is it: (a) to report the results of an
individual empirical study (a single-study
investigation) or is it ( b) to summarize a set of
empirical studies (a meta -analytic multiple -study
synthesis)?
If a, then we contend that hypothesis
testing should be a critical precursor to effect-size
estimation in telling the researcher’s story;
whereas if b, then effect-size reporting should play
a more prominent role. In that context, a critical
point of contention concerns whether the effect
sizes associated with a single -study investigation
should be interpreted in the absence of statistical
significance. We have cast our nay votes on (and
justifications for) this issue elsewhere (e.g., Levin,
1993; Levin & Robinson, 1999; Robinson &
Levin, 1997; Robinson, Funk, Halbur, & O’Ryan,
in press; Wainer & Robinson, in press) and will
summarize our stance here.
Almost without exception, introductory
statistics textbooks present examples based on
single -study investigations. And, of course, a good
number of single -study investigations are
published in educational-research scholarly
journals. Authors are forced to interpret the results
of statistical inference tests – and this is where
most of the troubles begin. In our previous
writings, we have argued that statistic al
significance should serve a gatekeeper function to
screen out effects whose direction has not been
determined probabilistically. What may appear to
be an interesting or important effect worth talking

Yes, everybody has troubles, and not just with
trivials (Sawilowsky, 2003). We adopt a different
perspective on the Sawilowsky vs. RobertsHenson debates about appropriate methodologies
for, and interpretations of, their respective Monte
Carlo investigations (Roberts & Henson, 2002;
Sawilowsky & Yoon, 2002).
Although we have decided biases
concerning the rights and wrongs of that particular
debate, we also have decided not to jump into the
fray for two related reasons: (1) Knapp (2003)
considers a number of general issues that need to
be considered in the context of Monte Carlo
simulation studies; and (2) because we regard such
issues more as background to certain more
fundamental research-related effect-size-reporting
foreground issues, we elected to forego additional
hammering on the former so that we might nail
down the latter.
Single-Study Investigations vs Multiple -Study
Syntheses
The major argument promoted here is one
that we have presented elsewhere (e.g., Levin,
1998; Levin & Robinson, 2000; see also
Onwuegbuzie & Levin, 2003). It can be sum-
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about can easily be a chance finding, or one that is
attributable solely to sampling error. In that case,
by screening out spurious effects through a formal
statistical test, an author protects the reader from
erroneously interpreting the effects as if they were
real.
Let us insert an important comment that
has rarely been mentioned in relation to the socalled “significance-testing controversy.” It is
simply that under the truth of the null hypothesis,
testing the hypothesis that, say, two population
means are equal or that the correlation between
two variables is zero is equivalent to testing the
hypothesis that the effect size is equal to zero. This
may be readily appreciated when inferences about
correlation coefficients are desired (because the
correlation coefficient itself is an effect-size
measure), though not as readily appreciated in the
mean-difference situation.
Yet, it becomes apparent when one
realizes that if the two population means are equal,
then :1 - :2 = 0, and the corresponding population
Cohen’s d effect-size measure is 0/F = 0. Thus, if
a researcher applies a formal statistical test and
then proceeds to report/interpret the sample effect
size regardless of the test’s outcome, the question
arises: What function did the statistical test serve,
and why was it even conducted in the first place?
That conclusion coherence issue (Levin &
Robinson, 2000) is one that Roberts and Henson
(2003) need to reconcile.
Another Troubling, Yet Telling, Hypothetical
Example
As a sequel to a perplexing example
(Levin & Robinson, 2000, p. 34-35; see also
Levin’s, 1993, p. 379), let us consider an
instructional intervention study with n = 2
participants in each of two conditions, where
Condition 1’s scores are both 5 and Condition 2’s
scores are both 6. For this example, a
nondirectional permutation test would indicate that
there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the
two populations are statistically different (p = 2/6
= .333, which far exceeds the conventional .05
level of statistic al significance).
On the other hand, if an effect-size
measure were computed and reported, it would
likely be communicated as gigantic or even
infinitely large, for in fact, in this particular
instance d is equal to 4. Alternatively, with effect
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size defined as a squared point-biserial correlation
coefficient, one would conclude that there is
perfect prediction of scores from knowledge of
condition, with no score variability left to be
explained, for r2 turns out to be 1.00 here. Never
mind that the study included only a couple
participants per condition and that a valid
statistical test performed on these data indicates a
nonsurprising event associated with an outcome
this or more extreme (i.e., p = .333), assuming that
the population-identity hypothesis is true.
Moreover, even if each condition were to include a
third participant (resulting in n = 3) who produced
the same scores of 5 and 6 for Conditions 1 and 2,
respectively,
the
associated
significance
probability would be only p = 2/20 = .10, still
above the conventional .05 level.
Although this particular example may
sound extreme, far fetched, or even ridiculous,
consider the myriad experiments in the educational
research literature that involve a comparison of
two different instructional approaches each based
on three teachers, classrooms, or schools. With
those teachers/classrooms/schools representing the
appropriate data-analysis units (e.g., Levin &
O’Donnell, 1999) and with the aggregated data
equal to the values just described, the above
significance probability of .10 applies.
This example also serves to clarify an oftmade argument that statistically nonsignificant
effects are invariably associated with small or
trivial effect sizes. Yes, a large-scale study (e.g., N
= 100) with trivial effects (e.g., d = .10) can
produce nonsignificant results, but so can a very
small-scale study with huge effects (as was just
illustrated). Conscientious conclusion-coherent
researchers should refrain from interpreting such
effects as either real (in both cases) or important
(in the second case).
Our example leads to consideration of a
converse situation as well, which was earlier
discussed by Robinson and Levin (1997). The
following question is regularly posed by one of us
on Ph.D. qualifying examinations: “What is wrong
with a researcher’s claim that ‘although the
anticipated outcome did not quite reach statistical
significance in this study, it would have if only a
few more participants had been included’?” This
claim is reminiscent of the substance of
Thompson’s (e.g., 1989, 1996) proposed “what if”
analyses and something toward which Roberts and
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Henson (2003) tread dangerously close. (We are
also troubled by the researcher’s use of the term
“quite” in the qualifying-examination question, as
will be reflected in our concluding paragraph.)
Thus, in our above amended example based on n =
3 participants per condition (for which p = .10),
can it be claimed that if only one more participant
were added to each condition the difference
between conditions would have been statistically
significant (since with n = 4, p = 2/70 = .029
according to a two-sample permutation test)?
Well, could it?
Only if you are willing also to add that the
outcome produced by the two additional scores
(resulting in n = 4 participants per condition)
mimicked exactly what was present in the original
data. In the case of a two-sample permutation test,
just as all three Condition 2 participants had higher
scores than all three Condition 1 participants in the
actually conducted study, only if the additional
participant in each condition maintained that
situation would there be a statistically significant
difference at the .05 level. In contrast, if either the
additional Condition 1 participant were to score
higher than any Condition 2 participant or the
additional Condition 2 participant were to score
lower than any Condition 1 participant, then p <
.05 statistical significance would not be attained
(see, for example, Fisher, 1960, pp. 11-15).
The key to answering the qualifyingexamination question is recognizing that one
cannot simply assume that the mean difference or
pattern will stay exactly the same with the addition
of a few more participants. That is precisely the
reason why one needs to collect actual data and
conduct the analysis, rather than sitting around
thinking in hypothetical “what if?” terms.
Robinson, Fouladi, Williams, and Bera (2002)
provide empirical data bearing on “what if”
pondering and Hoenig and Heisey (2001) discuss
an equally troubling related issue, post hoc or
observed power analyses.
But we have other fish to fry. In Roberts
and Henson’s (2003) concluding paragraph, it is
implied that researchers would be unable either to
conduct replication studies or to perform metaanalyses unless authors calculate and report all
effect sizes – including statistically nonsignificant
ones. Let us consider each of the two implied
components (replication studies and metaanalyses) of this contention in turn.

Is Effect-Size Information A Necessity For
Independent Replication Studies?
First, the replication component. If a
researcher chooses to replicate an experiment,
knowledge of the specific magnitude of a
nonsignificant outcome from that experiment is
not a prerequisite. The forefather of experimental
design and statistical hypothesis testing, Sir
Ronald Fisher, certainly could – and did –
replicate his agricultural experiments without
betting the farm on a single study’s effect sizes.
Indeed, Fisher believed that the direction of an
effect was only established if he could produce
consistent results based on several replications.
As investigators who have collected our
share of primary research data, our replication
philosophy is similar to Fisher’s. And the
difference between that philosophy and the one
apparently held by Roberts and Henson basically
comes down to the difference between the
publication of single -shot (one-experiment) studies
(their conception of published educational
research) and multiple -experiment replication-andextension studies (our conception). In fact, we
contend that much of the fury that characterizes
the debates between those who wish to do away
with statistical hypothesis testing and those who
defend the essence of it (see, for example, Harlow,
Mulaik, & Steiger, 1997) would dissipate if
researchers refrained from publishing and
interpreting single -shot studies.
Results that are statistically significant
permit two conclusions. First, they provide
evidence that the hypothesis under test (of which
the null hypothesis is a special case) is not
supported. Second, and less trivially (e.g., Cohen,
1994), they provide evidence of the direction of
the difference or relationship. For example, a
statistically significant t-test comparing the mean
scores of a treatment and control group tells us
that it is likely that the treatment group
outperformed the control group in the sampledfrom populations. Results that are not statistically
significant do not permit either of these
conclusions.
On the other hand, it is also possible that
certain statistically nonsignificant effects are real
but too small or fragile to be detected within the
parameters of the initial study. In that case, the
researcher must decide whether or not the effect is
worth pursuing. If so, a replication study is in
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order, which may involve changing/tweaking one
or more of the initial study’s features to make the
statistical test of the treatment effect more
sensitive – such as by incorporating a larger, more
homogeneous, or differently defined sample,
strengthening
the
treatment
and/or
its
implementation, modifying the experimental
design and analysis in some way (e.g., through
blocking or by including a relevant antecedent
variable in the analysis), or improving the
psychometric properties of the outcome measure.
If the replication study finds the effect to be
statistically significant, and if that replication is
followed by additional successful replications,
then
the
initially
spurned
statistically
nonsignificant effect will be resurrected.
Is Explicit Effect-Size Reporting A Necessity For
Meta-Analytic Literature Syntheses?
Roberts and Henson (2003, p. 226- 230)
argue (again, at least implicitly) that if multiple study syntheses are to be conducted, then reporting
effect sizes for each experiment allows a metaanalyst to compute an average effect size, as well
as to see how the size of the effect may vary as a
function of design changes. The argument has
been made that single -study investigations should
always include effect sizes, even for statistically
nonsignificant outcomes, so that meta-analysts
will be able to ply their trade using that study’s
effect-size estimate. What is ignored in this
argument is that a meta-analyst does not need the
primary researcher to provide explicit effect-size
information. As long as the researcher provides
sufficient statistics (in the form of either means,
variances/covariances, and sample sizes or the
associated test statistics) then a competent metaanalyst will be able to calculate the standardized
effect-size measures required for multiple -study
syntheses (see, for example, Robinson & Levin,
1997).
It is important to note here that we also
differ from Roberts and Henson (2003, p. 227230) in our view of whether research syntheses
should consist mostly of meta-analyses or of
programmatic replication-and-extension studies.
We opt mainly for the latter. We do not disagree
that meta-analysis, as conceived by Gene Glass
(1976) more than a generation ago, holds great
potential for revealing potentially important
findings that are shrouded in a literature where
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studies are classified only in terms of significant
and nonsignificant (see also Hunt, 1997).
However, much of what we have witnessed as
passing for meta-analyses in the educational and
psychological literature since Glass coined the
term may be more masking than revealing. For
example, certain meta-analytic studies consider all
the research on, say, visual aids in learning from
text (Robinson, 2002) or phonics/phonemic
instruction in beginning reading (Ehri, Nunes,
Willows, Schuster, Yaghoub-Zadeh, & Shanahan,
2001) without attending to the type and quality of
the materials or the specifics of the instruction.
Reporting the average effect sizes in such global
meta-analyses may inadvertently misinform the
reader.
Finally, we believe that there is another
plausible meta-analytic reason to favor single study authors reporting sufficient summary data
rather than the effect-size measures that can be
derived from them. It is because (at least in our
experience) that it is not unusual for authors to
derive effect-size measures incorrectly – in the
case of d, often with respect to the particular
standard deviation selected for the specific design
(e.g.,
between-subjects,
within-subjects,
ANCOVA) or question being asked, and in the
case of r2 , by not distinguishing between (or
confusing)
unconditional
and
conditional
proportions of variance explained (see, for
example, Olejnik & Algina, 2000).
This could easily lead an incautious, or
unchecking, meta-analyst down the wrong
estimation path. Meta-analysts are generally more
skilled in the nuances of effect-size types and
variations and are less prone to calculating effect
sizes incorrectly. Therefore, might it not even be a
more judicious research practice/recommendation
that meta-analysts routinely calculate effect sizes
themselves based on a researcher’s provided
summary statistics?
Conclusion
In summary, and in contrast to Roberts and
Henson’s (2003) research philosophy, we argue
that in the context of single -study investigations
statistically nonsignificant effect sizes should not
be reported or interpreted. That is because such
reporting/interpreting may lead readers to believe
– unwarrantedly – that evidence has been provided
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concerning the direction of the effect. Reporting
and interpreting effect sizes (with corresponding
confidence intervals) in multiple -experiment
studies where the effect of interest is replicated
(i.e., its direction is confirmed) may provide
readers with more useful information concerning
the believability and magnitude of the effect, along
with the consistency with which it can be
produced. Additionally, when a multiple experiment study is programmatic in nature (i.e.,
where the design is cumulatively extended to
estimate the effect under differing contextual and
procedural variations), then reporting effect sizes
may be helpful in pinpointing the conditions under
which the effect is strongest.
We hope that editors of educational
research journals will encourage authors to report
work consisting of multiple -experiment studies
that replicate and extend initial findings. This is
routine procedure in many behavioral science
disciplines; and as a clear illustration of editorially
practicing what we are preaching, see Levin
(1991, p. 5-6). For each experiment conducted, a
priori " levels, a posteriori p-values, sample -size
and power information, and sufficient statistics
should be reported.
In terms of summarizing the multiple
experiments, an author may wish to quantify
replicated effects, if that serves to inform
practitioners who are considering adopting the
intervention. At the same time, we are not so naive
as to believe that a journal-policy change of this
kind will happen overnight. Thus, until the
practice of publishing single -shot, non-replicated
findings changes, at least we hope that statistically
nonsignificant results will be regarded as evidence
that the direction of an effect of interest remains
undetermined and further research is needed
before a more definitive conclusion can be made.
Single-study investigators should not routinely
provide effect-size estimates for statistically
nonsignificant outcomes.
Multiple -study synthesizers can capture
those effect sizes from the sufficient statistics
reported. Finally, single -study authors should not
persist in interpreting or promoting a statistically
nonsignificant effect (which includes use of the
terms “not quite significant,” “almost significant,”
or “approaching significance”), due to the risk of
consumers regarding the effect as having been
formally screened as believable – when, in fact, no

formal evidence to that effect has been provided.
With editorial changes such as these, we strongly
suspect that many of educational research’s
analysis-and-reporting troubles would simply burst
like bubbles!
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